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Political economy theories of financial development argue that in countries where a narrow 
elite controls political decisions, financial development may be deliberately obstructed to 
deny access to finance to potential competitors. This paper empirically examines whether the 
level of liberalisation of the banking system, the stock market and capital account depend on 
regime characteristics, using panel data from 26 countries from 1973 – 1999. Our results 
show that it is predominantly fully democratic regimes that have liberalised financial systems. 
Countries that are not fully democratic have a lower probability of having liberal banking 
systems and capital accounts and this probability decreases with increasing democratisation. 
This suggests that the attractiveness of using financial levers to allocate funds in the economy 
increases with the amount of competition the government faces.  
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  11: Introduction 
The financial system serves to raise surplus funds from those agents whose current 
income exceeds their current consumption and passes them on as loans to agents who want to 
bring forward consumption against future income and firms, which have profitable 
opportunities for investment. This resource transfer can occur through the services of 
financial intermediaries such as banks, or through financial markets such as the stock and 
bond markets. There is a growing consensus that the development of an efficient and stable 
financial system is good for economic performance.
1 Much of the recent literature on 
financial development has therefore focused on the reason why some countries remain 
financially underdeveloped. There are a number of potential reasons for differences in 
financial development across countries, broadly falling into three interrelated groups. The 
literature on institutions and governance stresses that financial institutions need a legal and 
regulatory environment in which contracts can be enforced and bankers are given strong 
incentives to behave honestly.
2 The literature on law and finance, argues that specific types of 
legal system are more conducive to protecting investor rights and adapting the law to take into 
account financial innovation.
3  
The literature on the political economy of financial development, however, stresses 
the distributional consequences of financial development.
4 Free financial markets provide 
resources to new entrants, who can then make other markets competitive.
5 Conversely, 
financial underdevelopment means that access to economic opportunity is limited for those 
outside the incumbent elite. Governments representing small military / industrial elites, which 
would suffer economically from increased competition and consequently face an erosion of 
their political powers, may therefore oppose financial development, thereby restricting the 
entry of new domestic and foreign competitors.
6  
 
There is evidence that countries with more repressive political regimes have 
experienced slower development of financial markets.
7 However, there is so far no direct 
evidence that less democratic governments deliberately pursue policies resulting in financial 
underdevelopment. Such policies are often summarised in the term “financial repression”, 
which refers to a mixture of interest rate controls, high reserve requirements on banks, 
                                                 
1 See Levine (2003) and Demetriades and Andrianova (2004) for excellent recent overviews of the literature. 
2 e.g. Kaufmann et al (1999), Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998), Andrianova et al (2003). 
3 La Porta et al (1997, 1998), see Beck et al (2001a) for a review. 
4 Rajan and Zingales (2003a), Girma and Shortland (2004), Oechslin (2005) 
5 Rajan and Zingales (2003b) 
6 See Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2002) on the resistance of particular political elites to innovation and 
economic development 
7 Girma and Shortland (2004) 
  2directed credits and controls on capital inflows. Control over financial resources can also be 
achieved by state ownership of banks. On the other hand financial underdevelopment may 
simply be a result of a policy of neglect, where government fail to create the institutional 
preconditions necessary for financial development to take off, such as respect for the rule of 
law, secure property rights, low levels of corruption as well as competent and effective 
prudential regulation and supervision.
8  
 
As time series data on state ownership of banks are very limited, we examine whether 
governments intentionally suppress financial development by utilising the Kaminski and 
Schmukler (2003) dataset on governments’ financial liberalisation policies. The dataset tracks 
to what extent countries’ financial systems are repressed or liberalised across three 
dimensions: banking sector, stock market and capital account liberalisation. This allows us to 
examine the political and economic factors which determine whether governments liberalise 
their financial sectors. We test the hypothesis that a country’s political system is a significant 
determinant of a country’s choice to have a financial system open to foreign participation. We 
are also interested in international political factors, as the pressure to liberalise can come from 
the international financial institutions as a condition of a structural adjustment programme, or 
be part of international agreements, such as the OECD, GATS, or the Maastricht agreement, 
which promote financial market integration among members. We also control for economic 
conditions, such as the countries’ level of development, trade openness and fiscal 
performance.  
 
So far economic research in the area of financial liberalisation has mainly considered 
its effects on financial stability and economic growth, rather than the causes of financial 
liberalisation.
9 Research on the political economy of financial liberalisation has mainly been 
done in Politics and International Relations taking a case-study approach.
10 Empirical 
research on the domestic and systemic causes of liberalisation has only been carried out in the 
area of capital account liberalisation.
11  
This study therefore adds a new angle to the literature on financial (under-) 
development by empirically examining a potential channel through which financial 
                                                 
8 Rajan and Zingales (2003b) argue that a government’s failure to create the institutions that underpin successful 
financial development is a “deliberate act of omission” and indicates a “policy of malign neglect” intended to 
preserve the privileges of incumbents. Similarly, Oechslin (2005) shows that a low degree of creditor protection 
may be a deliberate policy to shift resources towards an oligarchic elite. 
9 Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1999) , Kaminski and Reinhart (1999), Stiglitz (2000), Kaminsky and 
Schmukler (2003) 
10 See for example Haggard et al (1993); Haggard and Maxfield (1996) Pauly (1988), Loriaux et al (1997) 
11 Alesina et al (1994) Leblang (1997) Quinn and Inclan (1997), Brune et al (2001),  
  3development may be impeded – through government controls on interest rates, credit controls 
and restrictions on deposits in foreign currencies in the banking sector, through limits on 
foreign ownership and profit repatriation in the stock market and by limiting international 
capital flows. The paper provides a nuanced picture of the politics of governments’ 
liberalisation policies. There are interesting nonlinearities and differences in the effects of the 
political system between the three dimensions of financial development. In particular we 
show that control over the banking system and capital account is relinquished mainly in fully 
democratic systems. As governments introduce increasing degrees of competition into the 
polity while falling short of a fully competitive political process, they are more likely to use 
financial repression of the banking system to control the flow of resources. There is less clear 
evidence for the politicisation of stock market liberalisation, but it appears that the probability 
of a country having a liberalised stock market rises with increasing democratisation.  
 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a brief review of the political 
economy literature on financial liberalisation. Section 3 describes the methodology and the 
data used. Results are presented and discussed in section 4 and section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2: The Political Economy of Financial Liberalisation 
  The reasons for government intervention in financial markets may be either 
developmental or political (rent-seeking).
12 The developmental view of financial repression 
argues that underdeveloped financial sectors might be unable to finance socially desirable 
long-term projects. Government intervention in credit markets may help to overcome this 
problem for example through credit guarantees, while interest controls lower the costs of the 
investment. Additionally the government may channel resources to particular “strategic” 
sectors as part of a country’s long-term development strategy
13.  
The political view of financial repression argues that governments may use control 
over financial flows to limit access to financial resources and corporate control to those within 
the elite and maximise the government’s ability to borrow domestically. In the political 
economy literature selective credit regulation is often seen as one of the government’s most 
powerful instruments to affect economic outcomes in capitalist economies (e.g. Zysman 
(1983)). Credit directives or selective rediscounting can be used to channel financial resources 
to state-owned and other connected enterprises, or sectors on which the government relies for 
                                                 
12 See Haggard and Lee (1993) for a discussion 
13 Early examples of such policies are the German and Japanese industrialisations and more recently Taiwan, 
Korea, Singapore and Hong Kong. 
  4political support. Financial repression in the stock market refers to practices, which limit the 
ability of foreign investors to participate in the stock market and repatriate their investment 
and dividends. Elite control over productive capacity is likely to be diluted if regulations 
allow foreign investors to acquire controlling stakes in domestic enterprises. Finally, capital 
controls shield the governments’ economic policy from the scrutiny of international and 
domestic investors. Savings are retained domestically and the tax base is maintained both for 
direct taxation and seigniorage revenues, as capital flight is limited even when policies are 
clearly unsustainable.  
 
Even if the government’s intervention in the financial system is intended to serve 
developmental purposes there are a number of problems. If deposit and lending rates are 
controlled at a low level then savings are discouraged and there is permanent excess demand 
for funds. Banks have little incentive to allocate loans to sectors not covered by government 
guarantees, although entrepreneurs in these sectors might propose higher return projects, 
leading to inefficient credit allocation. In the favoured sectors investment is not based on the 
true cost of capital and may be unnecessarily capital intensive. Moreover, government policy 
biases (e.g. import substitution) may fail to deliver sustainable economic growth. Even if the 
policy is successful
14, once particular sectors grow on the back of preferential treatment 
problems of rent-seeking and regulatory capture arise. “Strategic sectors” tend to be 
oligopolistic and therefore have considerable lobbying power, due to their financial resources 
and their ability to overcome collective action problems. Regulators often lack appropriate 
incentives and information and can be bribed to act on behalf of the regulated industries, 
rather than maximising social welfare. If favoured sectors would be bankrupted without 
access to cheap finance, preferential loans often continue to preserve employment and 
financial stability. Thus states tend to be weak vis-à-vis the interest groups generated by the 
credit policy, resulting in continued policy favours.  
 
Therefore, regardless of the initial intentions of governments credit policies generally 
generate a skewed production structure and “strategic interdependence” between the 
government and the favoured sectors
15. This over time results in potentially severe economic 
distortions. The theory of financial liberalisation based on McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) 
thus focuses on the economic benefits of liberalisation. It argues that abolishing financial 
repressive practices such as interest rate controls should result in financial deepening, as more 
                                                 
14 As it arguably has been in countries such as Japan, Taiwan and South Korea 
15 Haggard and Maxfield (1993) 
  5deposits are attracted into the financial sector by positive real interest rates. Higher interest 
rates improve the efficiency of credit allocation, as low productivity projects are no longer 
viable. This should eliminate excess demand for funds and hence the need for arbitrary or 
even corrupt credit allocation. Capital account and stock market liberalisation attract 
additional resources for investment but at the same time constrain governments to orthodox 
fiscal and monetary policies
 favoured by foreign investors.
16  
However, the research on the effects of financial liberalisation shows that financial 
liberalisation often has adverse consequences, particularly when liberalisation occurs before 
financial regulation and supervision are sufficiently effective to prevent moral hazard among 
banks.
17 In many less developed countries improperly sequenced reforms have resulted in 
financial instability, banking and debt crises and financial disintermediation, rather than 
delivering financial development and economic growth. Nonetheless, we assume that when 




Given that financial liberalisation is a political choice that has both efficiency and 
distributional (and therefore political) consequences, we will now look at the different 
political and economic factors that may play a part in a government’s choice to continue to 
repress or to liberalise the financial system.  
 
2:1 Domestic Political Factors  
  Financial repression tends to privilege a narrow elite with access to investment 
capital, corporate control and foreign exchange licences, while the costs of the resulting 
economic distortions are borne by the population at large. On the one hand it could be argued 
that the degree of the political elite’s insulation from electoral competition should be 
negatively associated with financial development. Autocratic governments tend to be 
accountable to a narrow military / industrial elite, which is likely to seek to control over 
financial resources to prevent entry and competition. Democratisation reduces the power of 
the privileged few, which benefit from financial repression. In competitive elections 
                                                 
16 The arguments for capital account liberalisation are based on decreasing marginal returns to capital, which 
make investment in countries with high labour to capital ratios attractive to both borrowers and lenders. 
Developing countries receive funds for investment which could not be raised domestically, while lenders receive 
higher returns than in their home markets. 
17 Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1999) , Kaminski and Reinhart (1999), Stiglitz (2000), Kaminsky and 
Schmukler (2003) 
18 I.e. we do not believe that governments cynically chose financial liberalisation to undermine financial 
development in the medium term. 
  6governments can be punished for economic mismanagement and creating or preserving a 
skewed income distribution at the ballot box.  
On the other hand there is the argument of the “political replacement effect”. 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2003) argue that if economic and institutional changes increase the 
probability that the incumbent political elite will lose political power and future rents, 
innovations will be adopted by “political elites that are subject to competition and those that 
are highly entrenched” while “(e)lites that are entrenched, but still fear replacement…will 
block innovation.”
19 Financial development is an example of an economic innovation which 
dilutes the privilege of incumbents.
20 This argument would suggest that the pattern of 
financial liberalisation is non-linear, and both extremes of the political spectrum – full 
democracies and extreme autocracies - are more likely to adopt financial liberalisation than 
intermediate regimes, where the political elite is more concerned about remaining in power. 
  Secondly, we consider the effect of major political instability on financial 
sector policies. The more unstable a regime is, the greater the incentive to control financial 
resources in the economy to be able to buy off potential threats to its tenure. Unstable systems 
are also more vulnerable to capital flight and changes in investor confidence and capital 
controls may be implemented to hinder capital outflows.  
Thirdly governments differ in their policy preferences depending on which 
socioeconomic interest within the population they represent. The political partisanship 
literature assumes that right-wing governments are supported by the highly skilled and 
holders of financial assets.
21 Owners of capital generally prefer not to be restricted in how 
they allocate their capital and will therefore support increasing financial globalisation. 
Moreover, financial liberalisation restricts the government’s macro-economic policies to those 
preferred by investors, such as price stability and lower taxes, again benefiting domestic 
holders of capital. Quinn and Inclan (1997) term this the “partisan macro-policy effect”.
22
However, this preference of holders of capital should be particularly strong in 
countries which are rich in capital. Holders of capital in labour-rich countries on the other 
hand might resist financial liberalisation, as they benefit from capital scarcity in the domestic 
market, as the rate of return to capital in a closed domestic market exceeds the rate in the rest 
of the world. Left wing governments representing labour interests may be unwilling to adopt 
policies of liberalisation, which may result in a period of unemployment as previously 
favoured sectors contract. However, in labour-rich countries labour will benefit from financial 
                                                 
19 Acemoglu and Robinson (2003), p3 
20 Free financial markets enable new entrants to set up enterprises competing with established elites in product 
markets. See discussion in Rajan and Zingales (2003a and 2003b) 
21 Quinn and Inclan (1997) 
22 Quinn and Inclan (1997) p779 
  7liberalisation in the medium to long term as foreign investment will be attracted and 
employment created. One would therefore expect that poor countries with left-wing 
governments would welcome liberalisation – Quinn and Inclan’s (1997) “partisan relative 
price effect”.
23 Given that centre parties rarely form on class lines but on ethnic and 
confessional lines,
24 we make no predictions regarding their attitudes to financial 
liberalisation. 
Finally, we consider the political power of private sector actors to influence 
government policy. In general the banking system would benefit from capital account 
liberalisation, which presents arbitrage opportunities between domestic and international 
interest rates and allows banks to serve their multinational clients. However, banks would be 
expected to resist the liberalisation of entry, as any gains from capital account liberalisation 
would at least partially accrue to foreign financial intermediaries.
25 This is particularly likely 
in developing countries, where foreign competitors would have access to lower cost funds and 
superior technology as well as being perceived as more reliable, allowing them to “cherry-
pick” among business opportunities. In addition in repressed financial systems the banking 
sector benefits from the profitable quid-pro-quos associated with preferential credit policies
26 
and relies on government credit guarantees to cover non-performing loans in their portfolios 
for their continued survival. For banks’ effectiveness in lobbying the degree of market 
concentration in the banking sector is important, as it determines how easily the banks can 
overcome collective action problems and whether banks are “too big to fail” and can therefore 
expect to be bailed out if depositor confidence fails.
27  
Secondly Haggard and Maxfield (1993) argue that the manufacturing sector has been 
the main beneficiary of selective credit policies in developing economies, except for a few 
countries in which the agricultural sector was politically significant. We therefore test the 
hypothesis that the larger the share of the manufacturing and agricultural sectors in the 
economy, the greater the probability that financial repression is continued.  
 
2:2 International Political Factors  
During the period under investigation international diplomacy was a force for 
financial liberalisation. Initially the drive towards liberalisation came mainly from the United 
                                                 
23 In contrast to this view Leblang (2003) argues that left-wing governments gain more than right-wing 
governments from sending credible signals that they are following orthodox policies. 
24 Quinn and Inclan (1997)  
25 Haggard and Maxfield (1996) 
26 Mainly cheap access to funds through interest rate controls, government deposits and automatic rediscounting 
at the central bank 
27 Haggard and Maxfield (1993) 
  8States. Its highly developed financial firms and successful manufacturing companies secured 
diplomatic support for the opening of foreign financial systems and capital accounts so that 
enterprises could invest and compete in profitable markets abroad. Amongst developed 
countries reciprocal access and mutual non-discrimination became the norms in international 
agreements. For example the obligations entailed in the formation of the OECD were 
instrumental in the liberalisation of Japanese finance.
28 As regards gaining market access to 
developing countries the US made financial liberalisation part of the NAFTA agreements and 
entered into bilateral negotiations about financial policy with South Korea and Taiwan.
29 The 
US was also a main driver of the services agenda (GATS) in the General Agreement on Trade 
and Tariffs. All countries subscribing to the GATS make commitments to extensive 
liberalisation of domestic financial systems, granting access to other member countries on the 
basis of mutual non-discrimination. 
Financial liberalisation in Europe was completed due to the agenda to create an 
integrated financial market in the EU to complement the common market for goods. This 
culminated in the Maastricht treaty, which obliged countries to dismantle capital controls and 
open financial systems to competition from other EU members.  
International pressure for financial liberalisation in developing countries is manifest in 
the conditionality attached to the loans of the International Financial Institutions. Especially 
in the 1990s financial liberalisation was part of the “Washington Consensus” and structural 
adjustment credits often entailed specific requirements regarding financial sector reform.  
 
2:3 Domestic Economic Factors  
Given that financial repression may have development goals, we would expect that 
while the economy performs well and economic growth is fast there will be little pressure for 
a change of policy. Once the economic distortions imposed by financial repression undermine 
economic performance we may observe financial liberalisation, for example as a policy 
response to a slow growth and a low level of savings and investment.  
High fiscal deficits are expected to have negative effects on the probability of financial 
liberalisation, and financial liberalisation can in turn be expected to provide incentives for 
governments to lower their budget deficits. In a repressed financial system investors have few 
alternatives to holding government debt and the government can use seigniorage finance to 
tax domestic savings. Liberalization is likely to destabilise the status quo with investors 
choosing to place their funds into high yield instruments elsewhere. While liberalisation 
                                                 
28 Pauly (1988) 
29 Haggard and Maxfield (1996) 
  9allows governments to access the international financial markets to cover the deficits instead 
of putting the burden on the domestic economy, this comes at the price of international 
scrutiny of government policy. Since the beginning of the third world debt crisis of 1982 
international investors have tended to quickly withdraw capital from developing countries 
where there was concern about the long-term sustainability of debt burdens. Overall one 
would expect high spending governments in developing countries to resist financial 
liberalisation, which on balance is likely to undermine the government’s taxation capacity 
more than the country would attract in foreign funds.  
In addition to the above factors financial liberalisation may be influenced by trade 
openness. Firstly, the main supporters of liberalisation are likely to be internationally 
orientated businesses (importers, exporters, multinationals), who are interested in making 
foreign investments, repatriating their profits and in depositing foreign exchange earnings 
with reliable financial intermediaries. The more open a country is to foreign trade, the larger 
the influence of the tradables sector is likely to be.
30 Secondly trade openness undermines the 
effectiveness of capital controls, as traders can under-invoice exports and over-invoice 
imports and bank any differences abroad.  
Finally we consider the country’s choice of exchange rate regime as a factor 
determining policy especially with respect to capital account liberalisation. If a country 
chooses an exchange rate peg, capital controls may be used to preserve a degree of monetary 
policy independence without resulting in immediate large-scale speculative attacks. 
 
2.4 International Economic Factors 
The political economy literature at least partially attributes the trend towards financial 
liberalisation to the increasing opportunities offered and constraints imposed by the 
international financial markets
31. Increased international financial integration gives financial 
asset holders
32 the opportunity to increase profits beyond the constraints imposed by domestic 
savings and investment opportunities. They therefore lobby for regulatory change, both 
regarding government control over domestic financial flows and barriers to international 
capital mobility. If the government does not respond to these demands, technological progress 
and the growth of the offshore markets has greatly enhanced the ability of investors to 
circumvent capital controls and place their funds abroad. Governments have therefore become 
less and less able to impose the cost of financial repression on financial asset holders and are 
                                                 
30 Rajan and Zingales (2003a, 2003b) 
31 Haggard and Maxfield (1993), Perez (1998) 
32  Not just banks but also investors and multinational corporations 
  10forced to alter their strategies by the “uncoordinated exit and evasion by financial market 
players”
33.  
Financial and balance of payments crises are expected to have an ambiguous effect on 
financial liberalisation. On the one hand financial fragility may trigger reversals in 
liberalisation. This may be to stem capital outflows or because governments realise that 
financial liberalisation has been “premature” and that regulation needs to be strengthened 
before banks can tap into the international financial markets again.
 34 On the other hand a 
balance of payments or currency crisis might leave the government little option but pursue 
policies that are likely to reassure and therefore attract international investors
35. Such policies 
are likely to be reinforced if the government is also subject to pressures from the IFI as 
discussed above. 
 
2:5 Domestic Institutions 
  The final factor in the analysis of financial liberalisation is the issue of institutional 
quality. Banking systems become fragile unless they are well regulated and monitored by a 
non-corrupt supervisory authority. Financial liberalisation exacerbates adverse selection 
problems as interest rates are liberalised and the intermediation of foreign funds can lead to 
additional risks, such as maturity and currency mismatch. Countries which have liberalised 
their financial systems without putting in place an effective system of prudential regulation 
first have at best failed to reap the benefits of financial globalisation and at worst have 
suffered major financial crises.
36  Even though for much of the period under investigation 
policy advice regarding financial liberalisation has disregarded these institutional 
fundamentals we control for regulatory quality in some of our regressions.  
 
 
3 Methodology and Data  
3:1 Methodology 
We examine the probability of both particular financial sectors and the financial 
system as a whole reaching a certain degree of openness. In order to investigate the 
determinants of financial liberalisation in the three sub-sectors (banking / stock market / 
capital account) we employ the ordered logit and probit models, which are designed for 
                                                 
33 Perez (1998) p 761 
34 For example the tightening of capital control in Malaysia in the wake of the Asian currency crisis of 1997 / 
1998 
35 See for example Maxfield (1996) on Mexican policies in the wake of the 1982 debt moratorium and Haggard 
and Maxfield (1996) 
36 Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1999) 
  11categorical data where there is a natural ordering of the categories. Our dependent variable 
captures the extent of financial repression (full liberalisation, partial liberalisation or 
repression) and as such falls into 3 ordered categories. For convenience we index the three 
categories by a numerical variable y=0 (full liberalisation), 1 (partial liberalisation) and 2 
(repression). Note that ordinary regression techniques would have been unsuitable in this 
setting because differences in the values of y denote only differences in ranking and not 
meaningful quantitative differences. 
The ordered probit and logit models are specified in term of the latent regression 
model  
                                                                                                             (1)  ε β + ′ = X y
*
For banking system liberalisation and stock market liberalisation the regressor vector X   
consists of: 
X = {polity, political orientation, regime stability, IMF dummy, openness, sectoral 
concentration, crisis dummies, (per capita GDP), year-trend} 
For capital account liberalisation the regressor vector X  consists of: 
X = { polity, political orientation, regime stability, IMF dummy, sectoral 
concentration, crisis dummies, fiscal deficit, pegged currency dummy, trade openness, 
(per capita GDP), year-trend } 
 
















where the µs are unknown ‘threshold’  parameters to be estimated along with β ( see for 
example, Greene, 2003 Chapter 21). When the stochastic error term ε in Equation (1) is 
normally distributed (has a logistic distribution) we get the ordered probit (logit) model. 
Denoting by Φ  the assumed cumulative distribution function; the probability of financial 
liberalisation can be obtained as  
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In our result section we report the marginal effects of a unit change in each of the 
regressors for the three probabilities. We did not estimate fixed effects ordered probit or logit 
models because these are not yet fully developed in the theoretical literature. The estimation 
of nonlinear fixed effects models is tricky, because the resulting estimators are generally 
inconsistent due the so-called incidental parameters problem. Therefore we pooled the data to 
estimate our models and computed robust standard errors to ensure that the statistical 
inferences we conduct are valid. 
 
We also examine the determinants of full and partial liberalisation across the three 
sectors using a standard panel probit / logit analysis, using the same explanatory variables as 
we use in the regressions examining capital account liberalisation. 
X = {polity, political orientation, regime stability, IMF dummy, sectoral 
concentration, crisis dummies, fiscal deficit, pegged currency dummy, trade openness, 




3:2:1 Dependent Variable 
We utilise the dataset constructed by Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003) (henceforth 
K&S) providing monthly data on financial liberalisation, capital account liberalisation and 
stock market liberalisation in 28 countries observed from January 1973 to June 1999
37. Each 
index takes values 1 / 2 / 3 representing fully liberalised, partially liberalised and repressed 
sectors respectively. The distribution of the variable is summarised in table 1. For a banking 
system to be considered fully liberalised there must be no controls on interest rates, no 
government directed credit allocation and deposits in foreign currencies must be permitted. A 
fully liberalised stock market allows foreign equity investment and places little restrictions on 
capital and profit repatriation. The capital account is considered fully liberalised, if banks can 
                                                 
37 11 European, 8 Asian, 7 Latin American, 2 North American. However, we can only use 26 countries in the 
analysis, as there are no political data on Hong Kong and the IMF and World Bank provide no data on Taiwan - 
see table 1 for a full list. 
  13borrow abroad freely and there are no restrictions on capital outflows or special exchange 
rates for capital account transaction.  
For the second part of the analysis we use the aggregate financial liberalisation 
variable. This considers a country’s financial system to be fully liberalised once at least two 
sectors are fully liberalised and the third one is partially liberalised. A country is classified as 
partially liberalised, if at least two sectors are partially liberalised – i.e the fully liberalised 
countries are a subset of the partially liberalised countries. As political data are only available 
on an annual basis, we use end of year observations. 
 
3:2:2 Independent Variables 
Domestic Politics 
To proxy for the accountability of the government we use the “combined polity score” 
-polity2 - as measured by the Polity IV database (Marshall et al 2003).
38 Polity2 is designed to 
record the regime's institutionalized authority characteristics. Firstly, the database records a 
democracy score (ranging from 0 to 10) for each country, based on the openness of the 
political process (i.e. the extent to which citizens can effectively express preferences about 
policies and leaders through elections) and the degree of restraints on the powers of the chief 
executive. The maximum score would be allocated to a democracy in which the executive is 
chosen in free and fair elections with universal suffrage and there are substantial checks and 
balances constraining the chief executive’s power.
39 Secondly each country has an autocracy 
score (again ranging from 0 to 10) based on how political leaders are selected (e.g. by 
designation or chosen from closed lists), the constraints on their powers and the regulation 
and competitiveness of political participation.
40 Polities may have mixed authority traits and 
can have intermediate scores on both the democracy and authority scores.
41 Subtracting the 
autocracy score from the democracy score of a country creates the polity2 variable. Higher 
scores of polity2  therefore indicate a higher degree of democracy. The polity2  variable 
appears to be a reasonable proxy of the extent to which the economically less privileged can 
express their dissatisfaction at the ballot box.
42 We therefore use the polity2 variable to test 
                                                 
38 Polity2 imputes normal ranges of polity scores for special polity conditions such as periods of transition and 
periods of collapse of the central authority. See Polity IV project Data-set Users Manual.  
39 The scale therefore discriminates between developed democratic systems on the basis of their limitation on the 
powers of the chief executive, for example France’s democracy score increases with the onset of “cohabitation” 
during the Mitterrand presidency. 
40 Regulation refers to who participates in the political process (has the right to vote), competitiveness to whether 
the opposition is suppressed (single party states) or restricted. 
41 For example South Africa in the 1980s has a democracy score of 7 and an autocracy score of 3, reflecting that 
within a relatively democratic system political participation was restricted to white South Africans. 
42 It is possible that there is an aggregation bias in the polity variable, however. The effects of increasing 
democracy are not necessarily symmetric with increasing concentration of power in autocracies. We therefore 
  14whether the incumbent elite is more likely to block financial reform in more authoritarian 
systems, as opposition demands for equal access to resources can be ignored.
43 A positive 
coefficient on the polity2 variable would be evidence of a democratisation effect, which 
enhances economic opportunities in line with political representation.  
To test whether financial liberalisation displays the pattern of a “political replacement 
effect” we also created a dummy variable (highdemoc) for countries in which the system is 
perfectly democratic (democracy = 10) as these are the polities in which political elites face 
effective electoral competition. A negative coefficient on the polity2 variable and a positive 
coefficient on highdemoc would indicate that polity2 captures the “entrenchment” of political 
elites, with steps towards democratisation increasing the chance of a government losing 
power. 
The variables capturing government preferences (leftwing and rightwing) are from the 
Clarke et al (1999) database and take the value 1 in each year that a right-wing / left wing 
government was in power. The proxy is based on party name based on the Western European 
left-right spectrum
44 and may not be appropriate in the context of less devoloped countries. 
For example one may incorrectly classify populist governments as right-wing. In the 
regression specifications presented in tables 3a, 4a, 5a and 6a only a right-wing dummy is 
included to capture the interests of holders of capital according to the “partisan macropolicy 
effect”
45. In the regression specifications presented in tables 3b, 4b, 5b and 6b the left and 
right-wing are interacted with GDP/capita to capture the different preferences of labour and 
capital depending on whether an economy is relatively rich in labour or rich in capital, that is 
the “partisan relative price effect”
46. 
Our proxy for political instability is the number of years that have elapsed since a 
regime transition: the variable “durable” from Polity IV
47. This is to capture the problems that 
are associated with governing in an unstable political environment in which several groups 
may be struggling violently for supremacy, as well as the likely negative effect of regime 
                                                                                                                                                          
experimented using the democracy and autocracy components of the polity2 variable separately. However the 
effect of the two variables does appear to be symmetric, producing very similar coefficients of opposite sign and 
the null hypothesis that βdemocracy + βautocracy = 0 cannot be rejected in any regression specification. We therefore 
use the combined polity variable in the regressions. 
43 Pagano and Volpin (2003). 
44 For example“conservative” / “socialist” / “labour”. 
45 Quinn and Inclan (1997) p 779 
46 Quinn and Inclan (1997) p776 
47 Regime change refers not to regular transfer of executive power, but major changes in the polity and 
interruptions in a regime such as coups, civil wars or foreign occupations. We use the durability variable from 
the 2003 version of the database, in which durability has been re-calculated and extended back to the beginning 
of the data series. 
  15change on financial and supervisory institutions. We take the natural logarithm of the variable 
in the regressions to address distribution problems (lndurable).  
To capture the intensity of pressures for financial repression we use the share of value 
added in the services sector as a percentage of GDP from the World Development Indicators. 
Data on the share in value of the manufacturing sector are less widely available. Given that 
both the manufacturing and the agricultural sector may exert pressure for preferential loans, 
the service sector share is a good proxy for the pressure for liberalisation. Endogeneity 
problems are likely to be limited as the services sector comprises not just financial services 
but retail, tourism, transport, health, education and other government services. We are not 
aware of a panel dataset on banking sector concentration which matches our time period and 





We capture international political pressure for financial liberalisation using dummy 
variables. The IMF dummy is equal to one for years in which countries had an IMF 
programme.
49 We also experimented with an interaction dummy between IMF and 1990s to 
capture the “Washington consensus” but did not arrive at significantly different conclusions.   
When we include a dummy variable for OECD members taking the value 1 from the 
year of their membership
50 we encounter problems of multicollinearity. The OECD dummy is 
very highly correlated with the dummy for highly democratic countries (correlation 0.86) and 
also with a dummy for countries having achieved a high level of development (correlation 
0.90). It is therefore not a “pure” proxy for the liberalisation pressures associated with OECD 
membership and is omitted from the analysis. A dummy for Maastricht taking the value one 
for the Maastricht signatory countries in the sample after 1992 results in perfect predictability 
for 48 observations.
51 Finally all the countries in the K&S sample of countries were members 
of the GATS from 1 January 1995, so there is no cross-country variation in the sample. 
 
Domestic Economics 
Data on trade openness (imports + exports as a share of GDP) are taken from the 
World Development Indicators. We use a three-year lagged average of fiscal imbalances (as a 
                                                 
48 Empirical literature in the area of banking sector concentration uses an averaged concentration variable based 
on data from 1989-1996 – see e.g. Deidda and Fatouh (2002). 
49 From IMF MONA database. 
50 Only two countries in the sample joined the OECD during the period under investigation: Mexico in 1994 and 
Korea in 1996 
51 Denmark, Germany, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, UK 
  16share of GDP) from Ghosh et al (2003). The dummy variable for whether a country is on a de 
jure pegged exchange rate regime is also taken from the dataset of Ghosh et al (2003)
 52.   
Low investment, savings and economic growth rates should be considered as a reason 
for a government to adopt a policy of financial liberalisation. However, in our sample 
liberalisation there are only a small number of liberalisation episodes
53 and once we exclude 
the countries that have already liberalised from the analysis there are not enough observations 
for meaningful econometric analysis. When we study the level of liberalisation, however, we 
do not include the above variables as they are endogenous to financial liberalisation – 
countries with liberal financial systems would be expected to generate higher savings rates, 
investment and growth.  
 
International Economics 
As we have a relatively short time series of 26 years, we do not empirically examine 
the contribution of specific changes in the international financial market as a driving force for 
domestic financial liberalisation. Any changes at the level of the international system are 
summarised in a year trend included in the regression. 
The currency and banking crisis dummies which capture the effect of crises on 
government financial policy are taken from the dataset of Ghosh et al (2003).  
 
Domestic Institutions 
Datasets of institutional quality have been collected since the 1980s (e.g. the ICRG 
dataset), but were initially limited in scope and report data on very broad definitions of 
institutional quality, such as whether the “rule of law” applies in a country. More recently 
some data have become available on “regulatory quality” (e.g. Kaufmann (1999) from 1996), 
which are more relevant to the question of whether the banking system is well supervised. 
Given the paucity of institutional data in the early period we use GDP per capita as a very 
broad proxy for a country’s institutional development, as this is available for the whole period 
and cross section of the panel. We note, however, that political freedoms and economic 
performance are correlated and that the inclusion of per capita GDP may interfere with the 
political variables. Tables 3a, 4a, 5a and 6a therefore present results excluding per capita 
GDP and tables 3b, 4b, 5b and 6b including per capita GDP. We use the natural log of per 
capita GDP in 1995 US$ from the World Development Indicators. 
                                                 
52 The exchange rate regime variable is based on countries’ declarations in the IMF Exchange Arrangements and 
Exchange Restrictions. 
53 Ca 10 per cent of total observations in the banking sector and capital account variable and ca 5 per cent of 
stock market observations 
  17 
3:3 Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics reported in Table 2 lend preliminary support to some of the 
hypotheses discussed above. On average the financial systems considered as liberalised across 
the three dimensions are significantly more democratic, contain a higher proportion of fully 
democratic countries and are more stable. The liberalised systems also had a higher share of 
services in the economy and a higher level of GDP per capita. 
On the other hand the IMF and the government preference variables do not have the 
expected distribution– the less liberalised systems have a higher proportion of IMF 
programmes and right wing governments. Banking crises seem to occur predominantly in 
liberal financial systems, while currency crises occur most often in repressed financial 
systems.  
As regards capital account openness, as expected the liberal regulations are observed 
in more open economies with floating currencies and their governments have a slightly better 
fiscal performance. Per capita GDP is not significantly different between partially open and 
closed capital accounts. 
 
4: Results 
The results of the sectoral analyses are presented in tables 3-5. We report the marginal 
effects for each of the independent variables for each category of liberalisation / repression.  
Polity2 appears to have a negative and significant effect on banking system and capital 
account liberalisation. Our interpretation of this result is that incremental changes towards 
democratisation may make it more important for the government to keep control of financial 
levers to remain in power. When the polity2 variable is disaggregated into its democracy and 
autocracy components, increasing autocracy lowers the probability of banking system 
repression – highly autocratic governments have direct ways of suppressing the opposition 
and do not need to use indirect ways of supporting their power base. This result is in line with 
Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2003) “political replacement effect”, if democratisation 
undermines the entrenchment of the political elite. Even when we control for the countries per 
capita GDP there is an additional effect from political regime characteristics.  
For stock markets increasing democratisation increases the probability of a 
liberalisation in line with the hypothesis that democratisation broadens access to economic 
opportunity. An alternative explanation would be that some of these countries only “open up 
  18cosmetically to foreign financing without deep-rooted reform”.
 54 This in fact tends to benefit 
the incumbent elite, as foreign investors focus on large and long-established firms to 
circumvent the problems of continued poor enforcement and poor information due to poor 
accounting standards. However, the results on political regime characteristics in the stock 
market regressions are not robust to the inclusion of the per capita GDP variable as reported 
in table 4b.   
A high level of democracy has an unambiguously positive effect on all aspects of 
financial liberalisation – a country with a high level of democracy has a significantly higher 
probability of the three aspects of finance being fully liberalised. It appears that fully 
democratic governments are willing (or are forced) to relinquish control over finance. 
Statistically the effect of a fully autocratic regime (a polity2 score of -10) on banking system 
and capital account liberalisation is comparable to that of a fully democratic regime. Again 
the results for the stock market liberalisation are not robust to including per capita GDP. 
There is little support for the right-wing governments’ preference for liberalisation 
from tables 3a, 4a, 5a and 6a, if anything the effect is opposite with right-wing governments 
suppressing the stock market (from 4a and 6a). As for the interaction terms of per capita GDP 
and government orientation the results in tables 3b and 4b suggest that both left and right-
wing governments become more likely to put restrictions on the banking sector and stock 
market as the country grows richer. This result is as predicted for the left-wing variable, but 
contradicts the intuition for right-wing governments. The most likely explanation is that the 
classification by party name is not appropriate outside Western Europe and North America 
and that some populist governments are incorrectly classified as right-wing. 
The durability variable is only significant in the capital account liberalisation 
regressions, having the expected effect: unstable governments have incentives to prevent 
capital flight. 
Contrary to expectations there is no statistical evidence that the IMF pushes countries 
to liberalise their financial systems. This result holds for the “pure” IMF variable, as well as 
when it is interacted with a dummy for the 1990s and when it is interacted with dummies for 
low income and upper-middle income countries – in all cases countries with an IMF 
programme are less likely to be fully liberalised. However, the result is likely to stem from the 
fact that it is the countries with the most pervasive economic problems that have an IMF 
programme in the first place. In these countries a certain degree of financial repression may in 
fact be advisable and therefore tolerated by the IMF. 
                                                 
54 See Rajan and Zingales (2003) p119 
  19There is support for the lobbying hypothesis from almost all regression specifications 
(and often highly significant): countries with large service sectors (i.e. countries with 
relatively small manufacturing and agricultural sectors, which may demand financial support) 
are more likely to be liberalised. 
The crises dummies suggest that currency crises are associated with repressed banking 
systems and banking crises with open capital accounts. The direction of causality could run 
either way in that currency crises can cause banking crises or a banking crisis can cause the 
run on the currency. Similarly the a prematurely liberalised current account may be the 
underlying cause of the capital account, or the capital account opening may occur in the wake 
of the crisis to attract foreign capital.   
It appears that rich countries are more likely to have a liberal capital account and stock 
market, with the coefficient in the stock market regressions being highly significant. 
However, the opposite appears to be the case for the banking system, where rich countries are 
ceteris paribus less likely to liberalise (the negative coefficient is only marginally significant, 
however). These contradictory results suggest caution about interpreting the per capita GDP 
variable as a proxy for the “institutional fundamentals”, which make successful financial 
liberalisation more likely.  
In the capital account regressions fiscal prudence raises the probability of having a 
globalised financial system, though the causality may run from financial liberalisation to 
fiscal austerity. Governments which tap the international markets are constrained in their 
fiscal policy choices as they are subject to the scrutiny of international investors. 
Governments do not appear to tap the international markets to cover large deficits at home, 
but instead finance large fiscal deficits by selling bonds in repressed domestic financial 
markets. A pegged exchange rate regime has the expected effect of raising the probability of 
repression – capital account controls are a way of combining fixed exchange rates with a 
degree of monetary policy autonomy. There is no evidence for the hypothesis that economies 
more open to international trade are more likely to give up capital controls.
55
Finally there is evidence for a trend of increasing financial liberalisation at the system 
level, as with each passing year the probability of financial liberalisation rises in each sector 
(almost always highly statistically significant).   
 
                                                 
55 The results in the capital account regressions are more or less consistent with the findings of Brune et 
al (2001), who found that fixed exchange rates and a lower level of development reduce capital account 
openness and democracy promotes liberalisation, particularly in developing countries. However, trade 
integration increased capital account openness in the Brune et al regressions. 
 
  20  The results of the analyses of the aggregate variables are summarised in tables 6 and 7. 
Table 6 uses the full set of countries, while table 7 looks only at middle and lower income 
countries. The results of the 3-sector analyses are generally confirmed in the bigger picture 
analysis. Incremental moves to democratise have negative effects on the probability of full 
liberalisation and even partial liberalisation, whereas the highest level of democracy has a 
highly significant positive effect in most regressions. When per capita GDP is included as a 
control (table 6b), it is shown that rich countries are more likely to implement policies of 
liberalisation, and there continues to be an independent negative effect from incremental steps 
towards democratisation and a positive effect from a fully democratic system. Again countries 
with strong service sectors and strong fiscal performances are less likely to be financially 
repressed. IMF programmes and currency crises are associated with financial repression, 
though no conclusions can be drawn regarding causality. Trade openness has ambiguous 
effects on the degree of liberalisation of the financial system, with neither coefficients nor 
significance levels stable across the different specifications and methodologies. The general 
time trend towards financial liberalisation regardless of country characteristics is also 
reconfirmed. 
  Table 7 excludes the high democracy dummy as none of the countries at the middle 
and lower income level were highly democratic and the left and right-wing dummies are also 
excluded, as the classification of parties according to their name is based on the Western 
European left-right spectrum, which has little relevance in Latin America and Asia. Again, 
democratisation has negative effects on the probability of financial liberalisation, while fiscal 
prudence and the size of the service sector have a positive effect. Similarly developing 
countries have become more likely to liberalise over time. Countries with higher per capita 
GDP appear more likely to fully liberalise, but this result is only marginally significant in one 
regression.  
 
Robustness of results and regression diagnostics 
  We estimated each model using both logit and probit analysis. In general both 
coefficients and significance levels are broadly similar regardless of the methodology used
56. 
The regression diagnostics included in each table also indicate that the two methods yield 
very similar results. We provide a number of regression statistics. In the sectoral analyses we 
report the Pseudo R-squared for each regression and an estimate of the percentage of each 
positive outcome that is correctly predicted by the equation. It is clear that the regression 
equation performs best at predicting outcomes for the large groups of liberalised and 
                                                 
56 The main exceptions are government balances and openness in tables 6 and 7. 
  21repressed systems and considerably less well on the small group of intermediate cases. 
Moreover, the model has the greatest explanatory power in the banking sector regressions and 
slightly less in the stock market regressions. Even though the capital account liberalisation 
regressions contained a greater number of explanatory variables, the model is less powerful 
here than for the other aspects of financial liberalisation. 
In the aggregate analysis the “partial liberalisation” variable includes both fully and 
partially liberalised systems (65% of total observations) and hence the problem of dealing 
with a relatively small group of outcomes does not arise. Here we report the positive 
predictive value (the probability that the positive outcome is correctly predicted), the negative 
predictive value (the probability that the negative outcome is correctly predicted) and the total 
percentage of correctly classified outcomes. When generating the predictions we disregard the 
country fixed effects. For the fully liberalised systems around 85% of observations are 
correctly predicted, for the partially liberalised systems this percentage is slightly lower at 
78%.  
Similar results are obtained in the regressions including all the countries and the 
regression using only the lower and middle income countries in the sample, indicating that it 




  The literature on financial development argues that some types of governments may 
have an interest in using financial repression to channel financial resources to favoured 
sectors, firms and individuals. Our analysis provides empirical evidence for Acemoglu and 
Robinson’s (2002) “political replacement effect”. In our sample highly democratic countries 
are the most likely to have fully liberalised financial systems across the three dimensions of 
banking system, stock market and capital account liberalisation. However, liberalisation does 
not receive a positive impact from democratisation unless regimes become fully democratic. 
It appears that governments in intermediate regimes (neither fully autocratic nor fully 
democratic) use the financial system to pay off their supporters. Such policies are probably 
unnecessary in fully autocratic systems, which have more direct ways of suppressing the 
opposition. In highly democratic systems they may be counterproductive: if the electoral 
system is fully competitive, governments risk handing control over finance to the opposition 
in case of electoral defeat, making it more difficult to regain control at the next election.  
On the other hand some of the results indicate that stock market liberalisation does 
benefit from increasing democratisation, with an additional impetus from a fully democratic 
  22system. Open stock markets and repressed banking may be a sensible government strategy in 
countries with a limited degree of democracy: foreign investment generates growth and 
benefits the population as a whole, while directed credits keep the businesses run by the 
established elite afloat. Examples of countries in which stock market liberalisation preceded 
banking system liberalisation are Brazil, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Thailand and Venezuela. 
Moreover, established businesses with demonstrable collateral are the most likely recipients 
of foreign capital inflows when stock markets are underdeveloped – to the benefit of the 
existing elite. 
There is also support for the hypothesis that governments may be lobbied by the 
manufacturing and agricultural sectors for continued financial repression, or indeed by a 
competitive services sector for increasing liberalisation. Governments appear to be more 
likely to liberalise their capital accounts when their fiscal performance is solid and tend to 
protect currency pegs through capital controls.  
 
  The paper therefore provides evidence that elites which are neither fully entrenched 
nor subject to intense electoral competition act as a barrier to financial development. They 
deliberately use policies of financial repression to keep control over who receives financial 
resources. Avenues for future research will be to extend the dataset to include a larger variety 
of countries at the lower end of the democracy score. This will make it possible to examine 
the effect of autocracy on financial development in greater detail, as well as analyse the 
timing of liberalisation policies rather than the level of liberalisation.  
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Table 1 
Distribution of the Dependent Variable 











52% 56% 41% 41% 
Partially 
liberalised 
16% 18% 23% 24%
57






Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Finland, France, Germany, Indonesia, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Thailand, UK, USA, Venezuela 
                                                 
57 “Partially liberalised” in the aggregate analysis includes the full and partial liberalisation outcomes, providing 
65% of observations 
  26Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics      
      
Banking System  Mean Liberal  Mean Partial   Mean repressed  
IMF 0.1806283  0.1491228  0.2758621 
polity2  7.138743 4.513761  3.616114 
highdemoc    0.539267  0.4122807  0.2887931 
rightwing    0.5055556  0.4036697  0.3080569 
durable    41.82199  32.66972  20.56398 
servi_gdp    57.85621  53.77491  51.73945 
bnkdur    0.2822581  0.146789  0.1764706 
curdur    0.1155914  0.1100917  0.1447964 
gdppcap 14794.69  13275.48  9554.426 
      
      
Stock Market  Mean Liberal  Mean Partial   Mean repressed  
IMF 0.120098  0.216  0.3794872 
polity2  8.293194 5.552  0.6153846 
highdemoc    0.6004902  0.384  0.1384615 
rightwing    0.3933518  0.5564516  0.4102564 
durable    47.91099  24.136  13.11282 
servi_gdp    59.77265  50.07467  49.32111 
bnkdur    0.2727273  0.0964912  0.2099448 
curdur    0.1154791  0.1052632  0.1546961 
gdppcap 16973.12  9877.455  5680.067 
      
      
Capital Account   Mean Liberal  Mean Partial   Mean repressed  
IMF 0.125  0.1987578  0.298893 
polity2  8.17037 4.931677 3.623616 
highdemoc    0.6182432  0.3354037  0.3062731 
rightwing    0.497992  0.40625  0.3763838 
durable    55.9037  23.49689  18.44649 
servi_gdp    61.59211  51.5907  51.07661 
bnkdur    0.2891156  0.1854305  0.1828794 
curdur    0.1122449  0.1125828  0.1439689 
govbalav3   0.0247852  0.0278128  0.0273881 
jurepeg   0.1768707  0.3112583  0.3372549 
openness   0.6562579  0.5945844  0.5043569 
gdppcap 18114.19  9028.711  9234.536 
 
 
  27Table 3a 
Banking Sector Liberalisation 




Liberalised   Repressed 
  Logit Probit  Logit  Probit  Logit Probit 
polity2   -0.0185*** -0.0179*** 0.0060***  0.0047***  0.0124***  0.0132*** 
  (0.0058) (0.0052) (0.0019)  (0.0014) (0.0037) (0.0038) 
Highdemoc‡ 0.1338  0.1705** -0.0442  -0.0456**  -0.0896  -0.1249** 
  (0.0859) (0.0749) (0.0274)  (0.0197) (0.0592) (0.0563) 
Rightwing‡  -0.0152  0.0018 0.0049  -0.0005  0.0103 -0.0013 
  (0.0520) (0.0470) (0.0168)  (0.0123) (0.0352) (0.0348) 
Lndurab 0.0276  0.022  -0.009  -0.0057  -0.0186  -0.0163 
  (0.0271) (0.0243) (0.0091)  (0.0065) (0.0183) (0.0179) 
IMF‡ -0.111*  -0.0945*  0.0316**  0.0217*  0.0793*  0.0728 
  (0.0630) (0.0574) (0.0160)  (0.0117) (0.0479) (0.0462) 
services / GDP  0.0111***  0.010***  -0.0036*** -0.0026***  -0.0075*** -0.0074*** 
  (0.0039) (0.0034) (0.0014)  (0.0010) (0.0027) (0.0025) 
Bnk.  duration‡  0.0155 0.0069 -0.0051  -0.0018  -0.0104  -0.0051 
  (0.0731) (0.0607) (0.0247)  (0.0161) (0.0484) (0.0446) 
Cur.  duration‡  -0.1410** -0.1387** 0.0358***  0.0274*** 0.1052*  0.1113** 
  (0.0714) (0.0637) (0.0138)  (0.0095) (0.0592) (0.0555) 
Year  0.0583*** 0.0565*** -0.0190***  -0.0147***  -0.0393***  -0.0418*** 
  (0.0085) (0.0080) (0.0031)  (0.0023) (0.0034) (0.0057) 
         
Number of  
Observations   630 630 630  630 630 630 
Pseudo 
R-squared  28.37 28.95 28.37  28.95 28.37 28.95 
Pr (1 if +)  82.2  81.9  19.8  19.9  60.5  60.4 
 
(‡) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
 
  28Table 3b 
Banking Sector Liberalisation 
Marginal Effects including per capita GDP and left and right preferences 
 
 Liberalised  Partially 
Liberalised
 Repressed 
  Logit Probit  Logit  Probit  Logit Probit 
polity2   -0.0142*** -0.015***  0.0049***  0.0041***  0.0092**  0.0109*** 
  (0.0057) (0.005)  (0.002)  (0.0015) (0.0043) (0.0038) 
Highdemoc‡  0.3155*** 0.3362*** -0.1075***  -0.093*** -0.2081***  -0.2432***
  (0.0747) (0.0699) (0.0237)  (0.0197) (0.0553) (0.0547) 
Rightpref -0.0195***  -0.0165*** 0.0068***  0.0044**  0.0127**  0.0119** 
  (0.0069) (0.0067) (0.0027)  (0.0022) (0.0581) (0.0052) 
Leftpref -0.026***  -0.0227*** 0.009***  0.0062***  0.017***  0.0165*** 
  (0.0081) (0.0075) (0.0031)  (0.0025) (0.0637) (0.0057) 
Lndurab 0.0438*  0.0353  -0.0152 -0.0097  -0.0286*  -0.0257 
  (0.0268) (0.0244) (0.0097)  (0.0071) (0.0176) (0.0175) 
IMF‡  -0.1563** -0.1364** 0.0449***  0.0309*** 0.1114**  0.1055** 
  (0.0652) (0.0589) (0.0162)  (0.0117) (0.0507) (0.0485) 
Services / GDP  0.015**  0.0116**  -0.052** -0.0032**  -0.0098**  -0.0084** 
  (0.007)  (0.0055) (0.0026)  (0.0015) (0.0041) (0.0038) 
Bnk.  duration‡  -0.0202 -0.0259 0.0069  -0.0068 0.0133  0.019 
  (0.0726) (0.0616) (0.024)  (0.0157) (0.0486) (0.046) 
Cur. duration‡  -0.2001***  -0.199***  0.048***  0.0356***  0.1522**  0.1633*** 

























Year 0.0674***  0.065***  -0.0234***  -0.0178*** -0.044***  -0.0472***
  (0.0011) (0.0157) (0.0028)  (0.0034) (0.0089) (0.0046) 
         
Number of  
Observations  
622 622 622  622  622  622 
Pseudo 
R-squared 
30.98 31.35 30.98  31.35 30.98 31.35 
Pr (1 if +)  83.5  84.0  20.2  19.6  63.7  63.4 
 
(‡) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
  29Table 4a 
Stock Market Liberalisation 
Marginal Effects without GDP per capita and using a right wing dummy 
 Liberalised  Partially  Liberalised Repressed 
  Logit Probit  Logit Probit  Logit Probit 
polity2   0.0144*** 0.0133*** -0.0053*** -0.0039*** -0.0091***  -0.0095***
  (0.0048) (0.0045) (0.0019) (0.0014) (0.0031) (0.0032) 
Highdemoc‡  0.1651*  0.1695** -0.0616* -0.0506**  -0.1035* -0.1188** 
  (0.0894) (0.0803) (0.0337) (0.0247) (0.0569) (0.0567) 
Rightwing‡  -0.2355***  -0.2152*** 0.0763*** 0.0555*** 0.1593*** 0.1597*** 
  (0.0473) (0.0439) (0.0177) (0.0135) (0.0339) (0.0335) 
Lndurab  0.0202  0.0199  -0.0074 -0.0058 -0.0128 -0.014 
  (0.0292) (0.0266) (0.0107) (0.0078) (0.0185) (0.0189) 
IMF‡  -0.1980***  -0.1896*** 0.0561*** 0.0415*** 0.1419*** 0.1481*** 
  (0.0592) (0.0542) (0.0148) (0.0107) (0.0483) (0.0465) 
services / GDP  0.0147***  0.0135***  -0.0054*** -0.0039*** -0.0093*** -0.0095***
  (0.0035) (0.0034) (0.0016) (0.0012) (0.0021) (0.0023) 
Bnk. duration‡  0.0075  0.0007  -0.0028 -0.0002 -0.0047 -0.0005 
  (0.0625) (0.0581) (0.0234) (0.0169) (0.0391) (0.0411) 
Cur. duration‡  -0.0622  -0.0626  0.0209 0.0163 0.0412 0.0462 
  (0.0691) (0.0639) (0.0211) (0.0148) (0.0483) (0.0492) 
Year 0.0356***  0.0339***  -0.013***  -0.0099*** -0.0225***  -0.0240***
  (0.0038) (0.0034) (0.0022) (0.0016) (0.0034) (0.0030) 
Number of  
Observations  630 630 630 630 630 630 
Regression 
Pseudo 
R-squared  25.96 26.21 25.96 26.21 25.96 26.21 
 
Pr (1 if +)  79.6 79.6 24.23  23.7 57.4 56.9 
 
(‡) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
 
  30Table 4b 
Stock Market Liberalisation 
Marginal Effects including per capita GDP and left and right preferences 
 
 Liberalised  Partially 
Liberalised
 Repressed 
  Logit Probit  Logit  Probit  Logit Probit 
polity2   0.0046  -0.0039 -0.0019  -0.0013 -0.0026 -0.0026 
  (0.0049) (0.0046) (0.0021)  (0.0015) (0.0029) (0.003) 
Highdemoc‡  -0.1070 -0.0969 0.0444  0.032  0.0626  0.0648 
  (0.1016) (0.0918) (0.0415)  (0.0301) (0.0606) (0.0623) 
Rightpref -0.0513***  -0.0475*** 0.0218***  0.0161***  0.0295***  0.0314*** 
  (0.0077) (0.0072) (0.0042)  (0.0034) (0.0057) (0.0047) 
Leftpref -0.0324***  -0.0298*** 0.0138***  -0.0101*** 0.018***  0.0197*** 
  (0.0092) (0.0082) (0.0043)  (0.0031) (0.0058) (0.0054) 
Lndurab  0.0409 0.0389 -0.0173  -0.0131  -0.0236  -0.0257 
  (0.0297) (0.0265) (0.0126)  (0.0091) (0.0176) (0.0177) 
IMF‡ -0.1502**  -0.1535*** 0.0545***  0.0427***  0.0957**  0.1108*** 
  (0.0636) (0.0571) (0.0202)  (0.0138) (0.0452) (0.0451) 
Services / GDP  0.0086  0.0086**  -0.0036 -0.0029**  -0.0049  -0.0057* 
  (0.0054) (0.0045) (0.0023)  (0.0015) (0.0033) (0.003) 
Bnk.  duration‡  0.0157  -0.0123 0.0067  -0.0041 -0.0089 -0.0081 
  (0.06)  (0.0573) (0.0261)  (0.0198) (0.0339) (0.0374) 
Cur.  duration‡  -0.0792 -0.0773 0.0304  0.0231  0.0488  0.0542 

























Year  0.0454*** 0.0429*** -0.0193***  -0.0145*** -0.0262***  -0.0284***
  (0.0018) (0.0045) (0.0022)  (0.0025) (0.0026) (0.0029) 
         
Number of  
Observations  
622 622 622  622  622  622 
Pseudo 
R-squared 
30.52 30.99 30.52  30.99 30.52 30.99 
Pr (1 if +)  79.2  80.1  24.6  24.6  60.2  58.4 
 
(‡) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
 
 
  31Table 5a 
Capital Account Liberalisation 
Marginal Effects GDP per capita and using a right wing dummy 
 Liberalised 
Partially 
Liberalised  Repressed 
 Logit  Probit  Logit  Probit  Logit  Probit 
polity2   -0.0145***  -0.0116** -0.0005 -0.0001 0.0150*** 0.0118** 
  (0.0051) (0.0049)  (0.0009)  (0.0005) (0.0051)  (0.0049) 
Highdemoc‡  0.1868***  0.1642***0.0031 0.0003 -0.1899***-0.1646** 
  (0.0686) (0.0671)  (0.0105)  (0.0065) (0.0698)  (0.0672) 
Rightwing‡  -0.0236  -0.0311  -0.0009 -0.0006 0.0246  0.0317 
  (0.0374) (0.0375)  N/a  (0.0015)  (0.0388)  (0.0383) 
Lndurab  0.0585** 0.0541**  0.0019 0.0006 -0.0604**  -0.0548** 
  (0.0270) (0.0248)  (0.0036)  (0.0022) (0.0279)  (0.0251) 
IMF‡  -0.0446  -0.0519  -0.0032 -0.0023 0.0478  0.0543 
  (0.0494) (0.0480)  (0.0060)  (0.0043) (0.0548)  (0.0517) 
Services  /  GDP 0.0116** 0.0116***0.0004 0.0001 -0.012***  -0.0118*** 
  (0.0047) (0.0036)  (0.0007)  (0.0005) (0.0048)  (0.0036) 
Bnk. duration‡  0.1001*  0.0847* -0.0046 -0.0032 -0.0955* -0.0815* 
  (0.0583) (0.0529)  (0.0094)  (0.0058) (0.0508)  (0.0483) 
Cur. duration‡  -0.0198 -0.027 -0.001*  -0.0009  0.021  0.0279 
  (0.0566) (0.0543)  (0.0046)  (0.0033) (0.0611)  (0.0574) 
Govbalav3  |  0.7940*  0.8116* 0.0263 0.0098 -0.8203* -0.8214* 
 (0.4859)  (0.4598)  (0.0526)  (0.0338) (0.5103)  (0.4681) 
Jurepeg‡  -0.0760* -0.0552 -0.0076  -0.0025  0.0836  0.0578 
 (0.0465)  (0.0457)  (0.0096)  (0.0045) (0.0549)  (0.0496) 
Openness    -0.0781  -0.0957  -0.0026 -0.0012 0.0807  0.0969 
 (0.0728)  (0.0745)  (0.0050)  (0.0039) (0.0746)  (0.0751) 
Year 0.02993***  0.0295***0.001  0.0004  -0.0309***-0.0299*** 
 (0.0011)  (0.0040)  (0.0018)  (0.0012) (0.0010)  (0.0042) 
Number of  
Observations  596  596  596 596 596  596 
Regression 
Pseudo 
R-squared  19.09  18.96  19.09 18.96 19.09  18.96 
 
Pr (1 if +)  69.7  68.4  29.6 28.5 60.7  59.9 
 
(‡) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
 
  32Table 5b 
Capital Account Liberalisation 
Marginal Effects including per capita GDP and left and right preferences 
 
 Liberalised  Partially 
Liberalised
 Repressed 
  Logit Probit  Logit  Probit  Logit Probit 
polity2   -0.0183*** -0.0153*** -0.000  -0.000  0.0188***  0.0154*** 
  (0.0061) (0.0055) (0.0011)  (0.00061)  (0.0062) (0.0062) 
Highdemoc‡ 0.1553** 0.1113  0.002  0.0001  -0.1572  -0.1128 
  (0.0698) (0.0714) (0.0089)  (0.0045) (0.0708) (0.0713) 
Rightpref  -0.0073 -0.0066 0.0002  0.0  0.0074  0.0066 
  (0.0062) (0.0059) (0.0004)  (0.0027) (0.0063) (0.0060) 
Leftpref  -0.0096 -0.0068 0.0002  0.0  0.0098  0.0069 
  (0.0075) (0.007)  (0.0006)  (0.0028) (0.0077) (0.0071) 
Lndurab  0.0556** 0.0525** -0.0013  0.0003  -0.057** -0.0528** 
  (0.0272) (0.0252) (0.0033)  (0.0021) (0.0277) (0.0252) 
IMF‡ -0.032  -0.0409  0.0017  0.0012  0.0337  0.0422 
  (0.052)  (0.0496) (0.0046)  (0.0033) (0.0563) (0.0524) 
Services / GDP  0.0094**  0.0095**  0.0002 0.0001  -0.0096**  -0.0095** 
  (0.0048) (0.0043) (0.0006)  (0.0004) (0.0049) (0.0043) 
Bnk.  duration‡  0.1113* 0.0921* -0.0071  -0.0045 -0.1043**  -0.0876* 
  (0.0583) (0.0532) (0.0107)  (0.0066) (0.0495) (0.0477) 
Cur.  duration‡  -0.0193 -0.0258 -0.0009  -0.0007 0.0202  0.0264 

























Govbalav3   0.8854* 0.8907* 0.0218  0.0044  -0.9072*  -0.8951** 
  (0.4823) (0.4675) (0.0556)  (0.0363) (0.4675) (0.4725) 
Jurepeg‡ -0.0825*  -0.0628  -0.008  -0.0027  0.0905*  0.0655 
  (0.0459) (0.0457) (0.0097)  (0.0047) (0.0543) (0.0497) 
Year  0.0327*** 0.0317*** -0.0008  -0.0002  -0.0335***  -0.0319***
  (0.0055) (0.0054) (0.002)  (0.0013) (0.0058) (0.0057) 
         
Number of  
Observations  
592 592 592  592  592  592 
Pseudo 
R-squared 
19.7 19.5 30.52  30.99  30.52  30.99 
Pr (1 if +)  70.2  69.4  29.8  28.5  60.3  59.8 
 
(‡) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 




  33Table 6a 
Full and Partial Liberalisation I 
Marginal Effects without GDP per capita and using a right wing dummy 
  Full liberalisation   Partial liberalisation 
  Logit Probit Logit Probit 
 
Polity2  -0.1683*** -0.0942*** -0.081***  -0.0087 
  (0.06606)  (0.03005)  (0.03235) ( 0.01757) 
Highdemoc ‡   6.0366***  2.3747***  3.004***  1.117*** 
  (1.09058)  (0.51847)  (0.61314) ( 0.31741) 
Rightwing ‡ 0.0494  0.0265  1.3346***  0.5576*** 
  (0.62012)  (0.27333)  (0.41234) ( 0.22596) 
Lndurab   -0.5865  -0.1283  -0.3275*  -0.1359 
  (0.38854)  (0.16108)  (0.19712) ( 0.1039) 
Imf ‡  -1.6948*** -0.5911  -1.0925*** -0.8619*** 
  (0.59445)  (0.31054)  (0.41227) ( 0.23614) 
Jurepeg ‡ -3.4623***  -1.3694***  1.0866***  0.2119 
  (0.61669)  (0.31787)  (0.41197) ( 0.21873) 
Govbalav3  22.5228*** 18.9608*** 11.2968*** -3.244 
  (6.29495)  (3.93583)  (4.52937) ( 2.30892) 
Services/GDP  0.2192*** 0.1186*** 0.2852*** 0.1268*** 
  (0.04444)  (0.02291)  (0.03912) ( 0.02093) 
Bnkdur ‡ 0.123  0.0077 -0.2611  -0.1306 
  (0.5068)  (0.2737)  (0.4284) ( 0.2230) 
Curdur ‡ -0.7215  -0.3423  -0.9336**  -0.5522** 
  (0.57092)  (0.30212)  (0.44979) ( 0.2400) 
Openness   -0.013  -0.9356**  0.3304*  -0.6639* 
  (1.1030)  (0.4486)  (0.7503) ( 0.3553) 
Year    0.5448*** 0.2629*** 0.3478*** 0.1749*** 
 (0.0637) (0.0276) (0.0400) (0.0198) 
Number of  
Observations  596 596  596 596 
 
Pr (+ if 1)  82.76 82.13  81.77 81.82 
Pr (- if 0)  86.54 86.7  70.28 70.62 
% correctly  
predicted  85.07 84.9  77.68 77.85 
 
(‡) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
 
  34Table 6b 
Full and Partial Liberalisation I 
Marginal Effects including per capita GDP and left and right preferences 
 
  Full liberalisation   Partial liberalisation 
  Logit Probit Logit Probit 
 
Polity2  -0.3609*** -0.1248***  -0.177***  -0.1117*** 
  (0.0749)  (0.0314)  (0.0397) (0.0209) 
Highdemoc ‡   1.916**  1.2387**  3.711***  2.627*** 
  (0.9174)  (0.5454)  (0.4584) (0.4584) 
Rightpref -0.114 -0.0419  -0.049 -0.0245 
  (0.072)  (0.0372)  (0.0526) (0.0286) 
Leftpref -0.0874  0.04444  -0.2273***  -0.0727**   
  (0.0712)  (0.0429)  (0.06238) (0.0298)  
Lndurab   -0.6773**  -0.1992  -0.7037***  -0.2535** 
  (0.1857)  (0.1857)  (0.2343) (0.1129) 
Imf ‡ -0.6414  -0.7075**  -1.4062***  -0.5486*** 
  (0.3431)  (0.3431)  (0.4635) (0.2384) 
Jurepeg ‡ -1.8356***  -0.7199**  0.5987  -0.0406*** 
  (0.6068)  (0.3092)  (0.4324) (0.2191) 
Govbalav3  39.0356*** 16.9498***  11.7386*** 4.248* 
  (7.5651)  (3.4483)  (4.6232) (2.4982) 
Services/GDP 0.2252*** 0.0976***  0.1864*** 0.1208*** 
  (0.0578)  (0.0244)  (0.0367) (0.02) 
Bnkdur ‡ -0.5425  -0.1098  -0.8342*  -0.3748 
  (0.5627)  (0.2779)  (0.4763) (0.2386) 
Curdur ‡ -0.7096  -0.4387  -1.1332**  -0.7148*** 
  (0.5855)  (0.3438)  (0.4683) (0.256) 
Openness   -0.6071  0.0107  -1.6465*  -0.5975 
  (1.4485)  (0.5141)  (0.8777) (0.4637) 
Ln GDP/cap  2.9479***  1.1284***  0.8280**  0.6892*** 
  (0.5661) (0.2427) (0.4088) (0.173) 
Year    0.6464*** 0.3235***  0.4966*** 0.2257*** 
 (0.0799) (0.0334) (0.054) (0.0228) 
Number of  
Observations  592 592  592 592 
 
Pr (+ if 1)  82.6% 81.94%  82.6% 81.91% 
Pr (- if 0)  85.3% 85.48%  72.6% 72.2% 
% correctly  
predicted  84.12 84.3  79.1  78.6 
 
(‡) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
  35Table 7  
Full and Partial Liberalisation: Lower and Middle Income Countries  
Marginal Effects 
  Full liberalisation   Partial liberalisation 
 Logit  Probit  Logit  Probit 
 
Polity2  -0.1248* -0.0617*  -0.0755**  -0.034 
  (0.0659)  (0.0326)  (0.0387) (0.0232) 
Imf ‡ -0.0713  0.0017  -0.7758**  -0.426* 
  (0.5669)  (0.3133)  (0.4579) (0.2554) 
Jurepeg ‡ -0.723  -0.3302  0.6871  -0.3852 
  (0.7873)  (0.425)  (0.5338) (0.311) 
Govbalav3 30.192***  15.5985***  7.6122  2.0279 
  (11.4142)  (5.9562)  (7.8061) (4.6038) 
Services/GDP 0.123**  0.0655**  0.0711*  0.0352 
  (0.0511)  (0.0272)  (0.0396) (0.0324) 
Curdur ‡ -0.4419  -0.26627  -1.1655***  -0.6688*** 
  (0.6089)  (0.3401)  (0.474) (0.2672) 
Ln GDP/cap  1.1334*  0.513  0.3151  0.0816 
  (0.6584) (0.3544) (0.605) (0.2977) 
Year   0.3378***  0.1833***  0.2931***  0.161*** 
 (0.0534) (0.0331) (0.0475) (0.0244) 
Number of  
Observations  284 284  284  284 
 
Pr (+ if 1)  77.8% 76.2%  80.0%  79.9% 
Pr (- if 0)  90.1% 89.6%  75.7%  75.2% 
% correctly  
predicted  87.3 86.6  77.8  77.5 
  
 
(‡) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
 
  36